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The decisions quoted and cited above clearly establish the proposition
that in Missouri the General Assembly may enact statutes regulating the
legal profession, as it does other professions and businesses. The enact-
ment of such statutes is not an encroachment upon the inherent power of
the Supreme Court to define and regulate the practice of law. The two
powers, judicial and legislative, exist concurrently so long as the legislative
power does not destroy or frustrate the judicial power.15
A. X. S.
BANKS AND BANKING-CONTRACTS OF INFANTS-DISTINCTION BETWEEN
LOAN AND DEPOST.-[Missouri].-Plaintiff, a minor, placed $900 with de-
fendant bank on time deposit, receiving a time certificate of deposit payable
six or twelve months after date, bearing interest. Thereafter defendant
bank became insolvent, and plaintiff, having reached the age of twenty-one,
filed claim for the $900. Her claim was classified as a common claim. Plain-
tiff filed a bill in equity disaffirming the contract and praying that she be
given a prior lien on the assets of the bank. Held, that disaffirmance of the
contract rendered it void ab initio, and that plaintiff was entitled to a prior
lien.' The reason given for the decision was that the transaction was not a
deposit, but a loan to the bank, and was therefore voidable at her option,
either during minority or within a reasonable time after attaining majority.
The court indicates that had the transaction been a "deposit," the result
might have been different, citing Phillips v. Tmst Company.2
In the Phillips case plaintiff was a St. Louis school child, who, with many
other children, had placed money with defendant trust company in a savings
account, evidenced by a pass book. When the company became insolvent,
plaintiff brought suit to establish the balance due him as a preferred claim
against the company's assets. The court held that although disaffirmance
of a minor's contract renders it void ab initio, yet where the contract is
beneficial to the minor, he cannot disaffirm-an exception to the general
rule of disaffirmance.3 Plaintiff attempted to establish a trust, but the
statute upon which he relied was construed to mean that a minor may
deposit his money in a savings account and withdraw it as though he were
of full age.4 A similar statute applies to a bank like that in the instant
15. Clark v. Austin; Same v. Coon; Same v. Hull, 101 S. W. (2d) 977
(Mo. 1937).
1. Stinson v. Bank of Queen City, 101 S. W. (2d) 537 (Mo. App. 1937).
2. 85 S. W. (2d) 923 (Mo. App. 1935).
3. Pinnell v. St. Louis San Francisco R. Co., 263 S. W. 182, 41 A. L. R.
1092 (Mo. 1924); Smalley v. Central Trust and Savings Co., 72 Ind. App.
296, 125 N. E. 789 (1920) ; Robinson v. Coulter, 90 Tenn. 705, 18 S. W. 250,
25 Am. St. Rep. 708 (1891); Aborn v. Janis, 113 N. Y. Supp. 309, 62 Misc.
Rep. 95 (1907).
4. Phillips v. Trust Co., 85 S. W. (2d) 923, 927 (Mo. App. 1935). The
statute, R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5465, provides: "When any deposit shall be
made by or in the name of any minor, the same shall be held for the
exclusive right and benefit of such minor, and free from the control or lien
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case, although it was not mentioned in the opinion.5 It seems that the court
in the instant case placed a strict construction upon the word "deposit" in
the statute, and since a line of Missouri cases holds a time deposit to be a
"loan,",, it felt that a "loan" was not within this statute. The net result
is that an infant may not disaffirm his contract where he has made a sav-
ings deposit, under the Phillips case, but he may disaffirm it where he has
made a time deposit, under the Stinson case.
The exact difference between a deposit and a loan has not been defini-
tively stated.7 The question therefore arises why, on principle, different
results should be reached in these two cases. A time deposit is generally
said to constitute a loan of money to the bank,s and the certificate issued
is in the nature of a promissory note of the bank,9 and may or may not be
negotiable. 10 This money is not paid back until the certificate matures.'1
of all other persons, except creditors, and shall be paid, together with the
interest thereon, to the person in whose name the deposit shall have been
made, and the receipt or acquittance of such minor shall be a valid and
sufficient release and discharge for such deposit or any part thereof to the
trust company."
5. R. S. Mo. 1929, sec. 5400 (banks of deposit and discount); R. S. Mo.
1929, sec. 5502 (savings banks).
6. Cantley v. Little River Drainage District, 318 Mo. 1120, 2 S. W. (2d)
607 (1928); Farmers and Traders Bank of Auxvasse v. Harrison, 321 Mo.
815, 12 S. W. (2d) 755 (1928) ; Round Prairie Bank of Fillmore v. Downey,
64 S. W. (2d) 701 (Mo. App. 1933) ; Contra, Southern Surety Co. v. Ruark,
97 Okla. 268, 223 Pac. 622 (1924) (certificate of deposit treated as deposit
and not as loan); McCormick v. Hopkins, 287 Ill. 66, 122 N. E. 151 (1919)
(a time certificate of deposit on which interest is paid by a bank, although
constituting a negotiable promissory note, held not a loan but a deposit).
7. In Murray v. First Trust and Savings Bank, 201 Iowa 1325, 207 N. W.
781, 783 (1926), it is said: "The definite distinction between a loan and a
deposit has never been formulated. All attempted definitions recognize the
close relation between the two and the difficulty of laying down any specific
rule of distinction, applicable alike to all cases. A tentative or proximate
definition has been put forward, and has frequently received judicial ap-
proval, as far as it goes. This is that a deposit is always subject to with-
drawal upon the demand of the depositor, whereas a loan is subject to call
only on and after its maturity date. The deficiency of this definition is that
it takes no account of time deposits, nor of call or demand loans... Re-
gardless of specific definition, the courts are agreed that there is a distinc-
tion between a deposit and a loan. Whether in a given case a transaction
is to be deemed a loan or a deposit is a question to be decided upon the
facts of that case."
8. Cantley v. Little River Drainage District, 318 Mo. 1120, 2 S. W. (2d)
607 (1928).
9. 1 Morse, Banks and Banking (6th ed. 1928) sec. 297.
10. Idem, sec. 299. It must contain words of negotiability in order to be
negotiable.
11. A typical certificate of deposit is set forth in Southern Surety Co. v.
Ruark, 97 Okl. 268, 223 Pac. 622 (1924): "Certificate of Deposit. Not sub-ject to check. The Picher National Bank, Picher, Okl. No. 127. 3/10/1920.
James Ruark has deposited in this bank $1000.00, one thousand dollars,
payable to the order of himself in current funds on the return of this cer-
tificate properly indorsed 6 months after date with interest at 4 percent
per annum. W. B. Smith, Cashier. No interest after 6 months. Int. $13.33."
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A savings deposit may be withdrawn at will. 12 A time deposit creates the
relation of debtor-creditor between bank and customer;$ so also does a
savings deposit.14 Moreover, under banking practice, time deposit funds and
savings deposit funds are not separated, but are mingled with the general
funds of the bank.15 The chief difference between the two transactions lies
in the time at which the respective funds may be withdrawn. The instant
case, however, indicates that there is another difference, namely, a benefit
to the infant by the savings deposit. But why is the infant benefited in the
one case more than in the other? In both transactions he is provided with
a safe place for his money and is paid interest on that money. If, as is
thought, the benefits are substantially the same in both cases, then the only
difference lies in the time of payment. To seize upon this technical distinc-
tion seems arbitrary, since the policy of protecting infants from disad-
vantageous contracts would seem to be no stronger in the case of the time
deposit than in the case of the savings deposit.
There is one factor which may have influenced the court in making this
distinction. In the Stinson case only one infant was seeking a preference,
and that in the amount of $900. The Phillips case, however, was a test
case, and had the plaintiff there been allowed a preference, many other
school children would also have been preferred, and the preferred claims
would have totalled over $80,000. If this factor is important, it remains to
be seen what will happen when the next possible situation arises, namely,
where a single minor, as in the Stinson case, attempts to establish a prefer-
ence where he has a savings deposit, as in the Phillips case.
J. L. F.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-DEPRESSION AS CONSIDERATION FOR REDUCING
RENT-[Texas]-.Is an economic depression sufficient consideration for an
agreement reducing the rent payable under a contract of lease? This is
answered affirmatively by a Texas Court of Appeals in the recent case of
Liebreich v. Tyler State Bank & Trust, Co.' The plaintiff had leased prop-
erty to the defendant in 1931 for five years. Because of financial hardship
in 1933, the defendant requested a reduction of rental price, and the plain-
tiff assented. At expiration of the five-year term, the plaintiff sued for the
original contract price, alleging lack of consideration for the modification
agreement. In declaring economic depression a good consideration, the
12. The contract may require 30 days notice of the withdrawal.
13. State v. Corning State Savings Bank, 136 Iowa 79, 113 N. W. 500
(1907).
14. 1 Morse, Banks and Banking (6th ed. 1928) sec. 289; Kantor Bros.
v. Wile, 158 N. Y. Supp. 115, 93 Misc. Rep. 438 (1916).
15. Inquiry at representative banks discloses that although the funds are
kept separate as bookkeeping items, yet they are both considered liabilities
of the bank and are not separated for investment purposes.
1. 100 S. W. (2d) 152 (Tex. 1936).
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